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Summary: Owing to its hiding nature, corruption is difficult to measure. However, measurements lacking sufficient methodological 
grounds and the rankings so created pose just as much of economic risk as the corruption itself. The objective of the present 
study is to examine the methodological compliance of the calculation of the most well-known corruption perceptions index after 
having reviewed the specific literature and by using the method of document analysis. The most important criticisms formed 
against corruption measures in the international specific literature also highlight that in the most cases the independence of 
the organizations issuing the corruption measures, the transparency of data sources used and the applied methodology are not 
ensured. It follows from all of the above, and due to improper compilation of the respondent group and the inadequacies of the 
summary of the data sources - in the absence of methodological substantiation - the results are not suitable for comparing the 
countries, to draw scientific conclusions, and they do not even make a diagnosis related to the phenomenon examined which 
could serves as an efficient tool for making the appropriate policy decisions.
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Due to the concealed nature of corruption 
its measurement is challenging. Yet, 
methodologically flawed quantification 
of corruption and subsequent ranking of 
nations implies equivalent economic risks as 
corruption itself. This study aims to investigate 
the scholarly and methodological propriety 
of the most popular corruption perception 
index, using document analysis as research 
method. critics point out that in most 
cases the independence of the organizations 
issuing the measurements, the transparency 
of data used and the applied methodology is 
not ensured for. consequently, and due to 
further methodological fallacies – inadequate 
composition of respondents and aggregation 
of data – results are unsuitable to enable a 
comparison of countries, or to draw scientific 
conclusions, nor does it provide a diagnosis 
that could be an effective tool to design policy 
interventions.
Not only corruption but the measurement 
of corruption, and as a result the ranking 
and possible stigmatization of countries (see 
Lambropoulou, 2012) also have substantial 
social and economic effects. The result 
achieved by any country according to the Email address: enemeth@metropolitan.hu
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corruption perception index by now is 
announced publicly together with the rate 
of the GDP growth or the amount of direct 
investment (Galtung, 2006). Its impact is 
illustrated well by that the willingness to invest 
may be set back by the poor result achieved in 
the corruption rankings (Warren and Laufer, 
2009). In 2004, Kenya was denied aids due 
to the poor results achieved in the corruption 
surveys of the World Bank and Transparency 
International (sampson, 2010). While the 
corruption indices undertake to measure 
perception, having distorted this, the media 
already talks about corruption: the portal 
'Index' published a news item on 29th January 
2019 with the title ‘steadily at the Bottom’, 
which said that ‘Together with Romania, 
Greece and Bulgaria, Hungary is still among the 
most corrupt countries of the European Union.’ 
International corruption rankings could also 
be tools for exerting influence; the publication 
of the results of corruption measurements and 
the media campaigns built thereon constitute 
the parts of a package, in which counsellors, 
representatives of civil and aid organizations or 
even officers responsible for loans provided by 
the International Monetary fund may demand 
that the countries concerned took over the 
institutional and regulatory solutions as well 
(sampson; 2010, sampson 2015, p. 121).
The corruption Perception Index of 
Transparency International is unarguably 
the most successful product concerning with 
the measurement of corruption. However, 
compared to its impact achieved through the 
public, the methodologies and the persons 
whose answers are used to form the index, 
as well as how reliably the index shows the 
corruption sensitivity of a given country are 
given little attention.
Through the identification of the credibility, 
measuring and validity risks of the corruption 
measurement systems, our aim is to answer the 
question whether the international corruption 
rankings – including the annually published 
corruption Perception Index, which has the 
greatest impact – are reliable, whether the 
methodology used by them allows scientific 
conclusions to be drawn, as well as whether 
the rankings are suitable for substantiating 
public policy interventions.
MeasurIng COrruPTIOn
The issue of the measurability of corruption 
became the focus of academic interest in 
the 1990s, simultaneously with the rise of 
combatting corruption. However, the efforts 
aimed at quantifying the rate of corruption 
encountered the problem that they were 
attempting to make the unmeasurable 
measurable. Due to the latency inherent 
in criminal statistics, the objective law 
enforcement data could not be used directly, 
while in questionnaire surveys the high rate 
of refusal to answer limited this attempt. As 
a result, corruption measuring approaches – 
also included in Figure 1 – had developed, 
such as:
perception-based measures: this typically 
questionnaire-based method is used for 
mapping issues (social trust, corruption) 
where the objective administrative data are 
missing for understandable reasons;
experience-based measures: aims at mapping 
direct experiences, it is based typically on 
personal interviews, therefore it is costly;
external (expert) evaluations: comprehen-
sive overview on national or industry level or 
the assessment of micro-level phenomena;
statistics using administrative data: 
national, government, sectoral, etc. statistics;
construction of composite indices: through 
the summary of different types of data 
collection carried out by other organizations 
and quantified results, the purpose of which is 
to concentrate the information and to ensure 
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comparability by creating one single index-
number;
methods measuring corruption risks: 
a system forecasting the likelihood of the 
occurrence of corruption and/or the rate of 
protection against corruption.
Different limitations apply in case of the 
different approaches, see more detailed in 
Trapnell (2015). The proper selection of the 
data sources is of crucial importance in each 
and every case, and in respect of perception-
based measures it is also of special importance 
that the questions included in the surveys are 
unambiguous and can be interpreted the same 
by everybody, while in course of the construction 
of composite indices, the careful selection of 
the procedure used to aggregate the indicators 
involved in the model requires attention. No 
matter which approach is used, if a phenomenon 
is measured with scientific tools, the fulfilment 
of the criteria of scientific substantiation shall be 
borne in mind at all times:
•	Is the impartiality, i.e. the independence 
and lack of bias of the measure ensured?;
•	Had the methodology applied and the 
data sources used been presented in at 
least with the level of detail that allows the 
measure to be repeated by an independent 
researcher, thereby allowing the results to 
be verifiable?;
•	Is the methodology of the research itself 
suitable for realizing the objectives of 
the research?, Does it use any statistical 
method through which the distorting 
effects of the data collection can be 
eliminated and the accidental differenced, 
simultaneous actions can be by-passed?;
•	Are the appropriateness and the repre-
sentativity of the sample respondents 
ensured?
Figure 1
Certain international measurement systems related to Corruption
Source: own edited
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The corruption measuring systems  
in the scientific literature
Despite the systems developed for measuring 
corruption being rather popular, the scientific 
community has warned to the reliability and 
validity risks thereof numerous times. The 
critical opinions formed in the scientific 
literature usually align with the criteria of 
scientific substantiation presented above, and 
they make negative observations related to the 
independence of the issuing organizations, 
the limited access to the methodology and the 
data sources used, as well as the inadequacies 
of the methodology.
The independence and objectivity of the issuing 
organizations
An important source of legitimacy for the 
organizations which construct the corruptions 
measures and rankings is that these organizations 
themselves and the measuring performed 
by them are free from bias, therefore they 
provide an objective picture of the corruption 
phenomenon. However, if the organization 
performing the evaluation follows an own 
public policy target system (see századvég, 
2016) or accepts financial support from a 
country which the organization evaluates, 
then the requirements of the independence 
and objectivity of the evaluation cannot 
prevail completely. With respect to one of the 
most popular corruption index-generating 
organization, Transparency International 
(TI), Sampson (2010; 2015) pointed out that 
the budget of TI is made up mostly by the 
donations of the ministries of foreign affairs 
of European states which at the same time 
are also the subjects of the corruptions survey 
carried out by TI annually. furthermore, 
in addition to the government aids, the 
organizations of the TI receive donations 
provided by private entities as well, and the 
donors often include large corporations with 
global investor interests (e.g. siemens AG) or 
non-governmental organizations, foundations 
and civil organizations active in shaping 
the political agenda (e.g. ford foundation, 
usAID), which traditionally operate in the 
foreign policy interest of the united states (see 
Krige, 1999). While sustaining themselves 
from financial contribution of the countries 
concerned by the measurement system, 
the organizations engaged in measuring 
corruption also actively contribute to the 
politicization of the issue of corruption, and in 
some cases thereby undermining the success of 
the public policy measures and the approaches 
which are impartial in terms of party policy, 
too (Heywood and Rose, 2014).
The transparency of the methodology 
and the data sources
Numerous authors warn of the risks entailed 
by the lack of transparency of the methodology 
and the data sources. ‘The lack of transparency 
in the production of measures of corruption is an 
ironic, and particularly embarrassing situation, 
(...). In particular, the lack of access to the data – 
which raises questions about the use of commercial 
data sources by (...) researchers – has meant 
that basic rules of scientific inquiry, such as the 
enablement of independent researchers to engage 
in replication exercises and proper validation 
tests, have not been followed.’ (Hawken and 
Munck, 2009, pp. 7-8)
Heywood and Rose (2014), as well as 
Sampson (2010) note that the organizations 
publishing the corruption indices usually 
refrain from having academic debate about 
the complexity and accuracy of the measure. 
Hawken és Munck (2009) argue that the 
organizations publishing the indices had not 
carried out the critical analysis of the reliability 
of the data sources before the development of 
the indices and as theoretical substantiation, as 
well as the posterior tests did not concentrate 
on measuring the reliability of the data used 
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either but merely on the correlations between 
the indicators. In addition, the co-authors 
expressed their concern because until the 
publication of their study, TI had not publish 
the data sources used for the corruption 
Perceptions Index (cPI) and acquired on the 
market. In summation, multiple critiques 
raises concern about the problem that the 
methodology and the data sources used are not 
presented with the detail which would allow 
independent researchers to repeat and verify 
the research.
The composition of the sample respondents
composite perception indices usually rely 
on indicators where the data providers are 
business operators, experts and – as the 
case may be – households and population 
groups. The construction of the sample 
respondents shall be suitable for providing 
authentic information about the phenomenon 
examined, in this case, about the corruption 
perception of the countries examined. It is 
debatable why experts and business operators 
are predominant among the respondents 
when the countries are the subjects of the 
corruption perception surveys, and whether 
it is even possible at all to create a true 
picture of the perception of the citizens if 
the research is carried out on a sample which 
does not represent the population concerned. 
In connection with the cPI Galtung (2006) 
also established that among the sample 
respondents not only the business operators 
and the experts are overrepresented but as a 
result the index shows the perspective of almost 
exclusively men with high standard of living, 
while it disregards the opinion of poor people 
and women, as well as the perception of the 
informal economic operators. furthermore, in 
his recommendation for the optimal weighting 
of corruption indicators Knack (2006) argues 
that in course of the construction of composite 
indices, the survey conducted on samples 
representing the national population shall be 
given a higher weight.
The scientific quality of the construction 
of composite indices
In most cases, the organization issuing the 
composite index does not participate in the 
data collection, therefore the scientific value 
added by it consists of the selection and 
summary of the data sources. According to 
Sampson (2010), although composite indices 
promise that through the joint use of multiple 
indicators they eliminate the accidental 
effects, however, they also obscure the concrete 
phenomenon measured by the data collection 
and the exact circumstances of the data 
collection. In connection with this limitation 
Apaza (2009) points out that composite 
indices are unable to provide a detailed picture 
of the nature of corruption, and consequently 
they cannot serve as an adequate tool for the 
fight against corruption. According to Søreide 
(2006), another limitation of composite indices 
is that they are unable to appropriately inform 
the reader about the scale of the phenomenon 
measured. Heywood and Rose (2014) pointed 
out that -as the case may be – the data sources 
used for the composite indices designated 
to measure the corruption perception have 
incompatible working definitions, and thus 
the summarization of the results arising from 
different conceptual starting points could 
lead to the blending of life phenomena and 
corruption transactions of different types. In 
addition to the above, the aggregated index 
may also conceal the measuring differences 
between the indicators selected for the purpose 
of the aggregation, since the indicators used are 
not always in accord. Hawken és Munck (2009. 
p. 5) highlighted that the average correlation 
of indices used for both the cPI and the ccI 
of the World Bank is 0.692, which means 
that approximately 50 percent of the variance 
remains unexplained. This strengthens the 
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assumption that the corruption phenomenon 
which is measured by the indicators eventually 
summarized is not the same. The authors also 
highlighted that the measurement differences 
between the indicators used are not random, 
and all these result in that the aggregation does 
not balance out the trend-like measurement 
differences but – to the contrary – they import 
it to the composite index. The problem is 
intensified further by that it is the availability 
of the data source that determines what weight 
the data source will have in the evaluation of 
the country concerned.
The construction of rankings
The establishment of rankings of countries 
is a misleading portrayal of the rate of 
corruption from several points of view. The 
approaches of Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov 
(2016), Dadašov, Hefeker and Lorz (2017), 
as well as Ferwerda (2017) are consistent in 
that corruption occurs under specific sectoral, 
industry or even international circumstances, 
which do not necessarily align with country 
borders. Sampson (2010) describes this as 
the ranking of the countries concealing the 
stakeholders who are on the ‘active corrupting 
party’ side of the corruption transaction, 
which compared to the country evaluated 
could – as the case may be – be a foreign 
company or investor as well. Malito (2014) 
established that the methodology of the cPI 
and the cc does not allow for the comparison 
of countries and comparison of the temporal 
change in the performance of the countries. 
Having examined the development of the cPI 
for a longer period, Heywood and Rose (2014. 
pp. 7-9) established that the indices calculated 
annually and per country show significant 
consistency and lack of change, namely there 
is no country which would show trend-like 
movement. It follows from the above that the 
annual measurements are not suitable for the 
back measuring of public policy interventions. 
All this questions the publication of the 
rankings on an annual basis, which could serve 
public relations purposes at the most. Malito 
(2014) and Søreide (2006) also pointed out 
that in the ‘expert-based’ perception survey 
repeated on an annual basis, the fact that 
experts learn about the preceding measurement 
results could inevitably lead to self-confirming 
feedback, moreover, the stigmatization could 
even become a self-fulfilling prophecy, see 
Warren and Laufer (2009).
The interpretation of the questionnaires
Malito (2014), Johnston (2004), Laufer (2006) 
and also Søreide (2006) pointed out that in 
the surveys which assess multiple countries 
with the same questionnaire, the expressions, 
concepts and categories used therein may be 
interpreted differently by the respondents 
subject to the different social contexts. While 
in some cultures the trips and representative 
business dinners may be claimed legally in the 
‘marketing’ cost category, in other countries 
the same practices could be considered as 
prohibited influencing. An example for this is 
the system of medical gratuity. Whether the 
financial gratuity or gift given after the use 
of the medical service constitutes corruption 
abuse is subject to varying considerations in 
each country. However, the same phenomenon 
could be subject to different consideration 
even within the same country: for example, 
according to the fcPA regulation of the usA, 
the benefit provided to any foreign decision-
maker is legal up to a certain threshold: it is 
considered as ‘facilitation payment’ (strauss, 
2013), however, in the territory of the usA, 
such transaction conducted with a government 
official would be illegal.
The factors distorting the corruption perception
Measuring the perception of corruption 
is nothing more than summarizing the 
respondents’ opinion on the extent certain 
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institutions, types of transactions or countries are 
corrupt according to the respondent. Although 
for a long time the perception indicators had 
been regarded as the best available tools for 
measuring corruption, simultaneously with the 
spread of the perception measures more and 
more researchers were interested in the question 
what relationship the corruption perception 
showed with the corruption experiences.
According to Zaman and Rahim (2009), 
no matter how complex our measurement 
method is, in course of measuring corruption 
perception we cannot be sure that the results in 
fact provide information about the corruption. 
Treisman (2007) thought along the same lines 
when he called the perception indices based 
on experts panels ‘subjective indices’ which 
reflect the conclusions of the interviewed.
Treisman (2007) and Weber Abramo (2008) 
both established that corruption perception 
does not show a strong correlation with the 
corruption experience. Meanwhile Donchev 
and Ujhelyi (2014) came to the conclusion 
that the level of corruption experience does not 
predict the expected value of the corruption 
perception, and the connection between the 
corruption perception and experience is not 
linear. At the same time, their study sheds 
a new light on the effects of democratic 
political or social institutions. It is shown 
that protestant nature, the level of economic 
development or the strength of the central 
government of a given society – without 
decreasing the corruption experiences – adjust 
the corruption perception downwards.
further factors which distort corruption 
perception were identified by Olken (2009), 
who established based on his results that ethnic 
or religious heterogeneity increases corruption 
perception, at the same time – paradoxically – 
in communities of greater religious and ethnic 
heterogeneity, the indicator designated to 
measure actual corruption is lower. The author 
accounted this for the level of social trust and 
social control. In addition, Gutmann, Padovano 
and Voigt (2015) showed that corruption 
perception may be higher among respondents 
who are unemployed, have low income, or if 
their answers were raised during economic 
downturn, as well as corruption perception is 
lower if the answers were given by optimistic 
societies with high economic growth rates 
and low level of income inequality, while 
in countries hallmarked by strong political 
competition, the rate of corruption perception 
is typically higher. Accordingly, corruption 
perception is affected by numerous factors in 
addition to corruption. Jahedi and Mendez 
(2014) acknowledged that the subjective 
indicators are diverted by economic and 
cognitive factors, and those may show negative 
correlation with the objective data, however, 
according to them this is not sufficient reason 
for disregarding the data sources. In the 
opinion of Roca, Orme and Brown (2010), the 
rate of corruption perception is also related to 
the representation thereof in the media. This 
could be the reason why countries where the 
press operates under political control are able 
to show relatively good corruption perception 
results. Based on media content analysis and 
the comparison of the cPI figures, Németh, 
Körmendi and Kiss (2011) established that 
the media – while fulfilling its social duty by 
revealing and presenting the corruption cases 
– contributes to the increase of the rate of 
corruption perceived by the population.
THe relIaBIlITy anD MeTHODOlOgICal 
suBsTanTIaTIOn OF THe 
COrruPTIOn PerCePTIOn InDex
since 1995, Transparency International has 
been publishing annually the results of the 
corruption Perception Index designated to 
measure the corruption perception, as well 
as the ranking of the countries evaluated 
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established based on such results. The 
composite index of the cPI is calculated by 
using 13 data sources, which include both 
directly available data sources and data sources 
which are available only commercially. In the 
following we provide a detailed presentation 
of the findings concerning the criteria of 
scientific substantiation, based on which we 
want to answer the question whether the cPI 
index of Transparency International is reliable, 
suitable for drawing scientific conclusions, 
and whether as a result its role is justified in 
substantiating policy decisions.
The independence of  the organization 
releasing the index
Transparency International receives direct or 
indirect donations from multiple government 
agencies of countries graded by the 
measurement system.1 The other main source 
of funding of the organization is made up of 
the donations received from market operators, 
large corporations and foundations. According 
to the data of the annual accounts2, the largest 
donor of Transparency International has 
been the European commission since 2015, 
however, numerous government bodies and 
foundations are also providing subsidies in 
excess of 1 million Euros per annum to the 
organization. The main donors are included 
in Table 1, in case of the donor organizations 
attributable to governments, with the last three 
years’ cPI score and ranking of the countries.
In course of its CPI calculation 
Transparency International evaluates those 
donor countries as well which support its 
operation with significant amounts. Based 
on the comparison of the CPI figures of 
the largest donor countries it can be shown 
that these countries regularly achieve good 
results in the CPI evaluation and they are 
typically in the first ten places.
The methodology of  the CPI index and 
the transparency of  the data sources used
Despite the fact that Transparency International 
publishes the description of the 13 data 
sources used for the calculation of the cPI on 
its website,,3 as well as that in a summarized 
data table it also specifies the data sources it 
had used for calculating the cPI score of each 
country, Transparency International does not 
reveal the methodology and the content of the 
data sources with sufficient detail in numerous 
respects.
certain data sources are inaccessible. 
The methodological description published 
by TI does not explain that the answers to 
exactly which questions are reflected in the 
WJP and VDEM indicators.4 In addition, 
of the 13 data sources used to calculate the 
index, the accessibility of five data sources 
is significantly limited. Thus, the content 
and detailed methodology of the country 
risk evaluation carried out by EIu, the 
international risk assessment prepared by the 
PRs Group, and the risk assessment prepared 
by IHs Markit (Global Insight) are accessible 
against payment only. similarly, also limited 
in accessibility are the base data used for the 
competitiveness ranking of the International 
Institute for Management Development, in 
which case the scores of each country are made 
publicly available, however, the yearbook 
containing the detailed data is available only 
against payment. The PRs Group and the EIu 
organizations do not publish information as to 
whether the basis of the risk analysis are factual 
data or expert perceptions. In case of multiple 
data sources neither the composition of the 
expert respondent group, nor the principles of 
the composition thereof is accessible (for more 
details see the parts titled ‘Is the representativity 
of the sample respondents ensured? In the 
composition of the expert panels, are expertise 
and impartiality ensured?’).
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Table 1
statement on the donor organizations supporting  
the operation of ti
the largest donors in 2017
the amount of 
the donation in 
2017 (eur)
Cpi score (and ranking) in case 
of donor countries
Government bodies 2018 2017 2016
Department of Foreign affairs and Development 
(DFarD)  
Canada
1.970.391  81 (9)  82 (8)  82 (9)
Federal Ministry of economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ) 
Germany
1.499.457  80  (11)  81 (12)  81 (10)
Dutch Ministry of Foreign affairs  
Netherlands
1.200.000  82 (8)  82 (8)  83 (8)
Development and Cooperation agency (sDC)  
Sweden
1.040.957  85 (3)  84 (6)  88 (4)
Department of Foreign affairs and Trade (DFaT)  
Australia
864.657  77 (13)  77 (13)  79 (13)
Department of state of the usa  
USA
763.074  71 (22)  75 (16)  74 (18)
Multilateral institution
european Commission 4.580.722
Foundations
BHP Billiton Foundation 1.335.930
Organizations of the Open society Institute 
Foundation Open society Institute 
Foundation to Promote Open society 
Open society Initiative for West africa
705.389
213.225
17.808
Corporations, market operators
siemens ag 856.835
Source: 2017 financial statement of TI
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It cannot be established how the data 
sources listed are rid of factors foreign to 
corruption. There are numerous data sources 
among the data sources used which evaluate 
factors which are unrelated to corruption 
or the perception of corruption. In the 
approximately 70-question questionnaire of 
the sGI index of Bertelsmann stiftung, only 
one single question is about the perception of 
corruption.5 country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment of the African Development 
Bank measures 5 dimensions, of which 
however only one dimension (structural 
Policies and Regulation), and within that 
only the evaluation of the transparency 
and accountability of the public sector can 
be attributed to corruption. Although the 
sGI codebook refers to that in course of 
the calculation of the cPI only the relevant 
question is taken into consideration,6 the 
methodology documents published by 
Transparency International do not explain 
how the data sources used in course of the 
scoring are rid of factors foreign to corruption.
With regard to the issues presented here, 
further information is provided by Table 2, 
which contains the main characteristics of the 
data sources used in course of the calculation 
of the 2018 cPI index.
The scientific substantiation  
of  the index calculation methodology
It is easily understandable that if we want to 
compare the same phenomenon based on a 
different number of indicators which do not 
measure the same phenomenon, then it does 
not satisfy the criteria of scientific rigour. 
The cPI scores are developed from data 
originating from different data sources, after 
standardization and through simple averaging. 
In course of the calculation of the index, in 
respect of the evaluation of the countries there 
are however significant differences depending 
on the number of the data sources the score of 
the index calculated for the country concerned 
is based on, as well as subject to the data 
sources used. Therefore, depending on the 
data sources available for the evaluation of the 
country, in respect of different countries the 
same data may be taken into consideration 
differently. This eventuality of the availability 
of the data sources used raises methodological 
risks from the aspect of comparability. The 
cPI was calculated by using 10 data sources in 
case of merely 5 percent – including Hungary 
– of the 180 countries in total which were 
evaluated in 2018. The drawback lies in that 
in case of 40 countries five or even less data 
sources had been available for the evaluation 
(see Figure 2). Therefore, the corruption 
perception characteristic typically for countries 
in Africa, Asian and the Pacific region is based 
on significantly less data.
significant differences can be noticed 
within the group of European states as well. 
The Nations in Transit index of freedom 
House and the Transformation Index of the 
Bertelsmann stiftung are counted in the cPI 
score of merely 11 former socialist countries 
– including Hungary – of the 31 European 
countries. In case of the Transformation Index 
it is a risk that the figure of the index reflects 
the opinion of only 2 experts interviewed per 
country. The methodological audit prepared by 
the Joint Research centre and published also 
by Transparency notes that in case of countries 
evaluated based on less than five data sources, 
the standard error is significantly higher, and 
they refer to that it would be advisable to 
specify the minimum number of data sources 
as at least five sources.7
overall, due to the eventuality of the 
availability of the data sources, and thus the 
differences in the composition of the data 
sources used, with respect to certain countries 
the data used for the calculation of the cPI 
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Table 2
summary of the data sourCes used for the Cpi
Cpi 2018 data sources period data providers
aFDB african Development Bank 
Country Policy and Institutional assessment
2016 expert groups,  
their identity, number, selection criteria are not accessible
sgI Bertelsmann stiftung  
sustainable governance Indicators
2018 91 experts in total 
(typically 2 per country, 3 to 4 persons per occasion)their 
identity is known, however, the criteria for their selection are 
not accessible + statistical, quantitative data
TI Bertelsmann stiftung  
Transformation Index
2017-
2018
246 experts in total (typically 2 per country) 
their identity is partially known, however, the criteria for their 
selection are not accessible
eIu economist Intelligence unit  
Country risk service
2018 limited access
FH Freedom  
House nations in Transit
2018 expert groups,  
their identity, number, and the selection criteria are not accessible
gI IHs Markit global Insight Business 
Conditions and risk Indicators
2017 More than 100 country experts 
their identity and the selection criteria are not accessible
IMD World Competitiveness Center  
World Competitiveness yearbook executive 
Opinion survey
2018 survey done by interviewing approx. 6300 businessmen from 
63 countries, 
their identity and the selection criteria are not accessible
PerC Political and economic risk Consultancy 
asian Intelligence
2018 survey done by interviewing 1802 businessmen (approx. 100 
respondents/country), 
their identity and the selection criteria are not accessible
Prs group  
International Country risk guide
2018 limited access
WB World Bank  
Country Policy and Institutional assessment
2017 The evaluation is performed by the employees of the World Bank, 
their identity, number, and the selection criteria are not accessible
WeF World economic Forum 
executive Opinion survey
2018 survey done by interviewing 12274 businessmen from 140 
countries,due to the large number of respondents, their 
identity is not accessible, however, the selection criteria are 
accessible (random sample selected from groups according 
to sector and company size)
WJP World Justice Project rule of law Index 
expert survey
2017-
2018
survey done by interviewing 110 000 households and 3000 
experts from 113 countries  
The number of respondents is known; the identity of the 
expert, the sampling criteria and the criteria for selecting the 
experts are partially accessible
VDeM Varieties of Democracy 2018 approx. 2000 experts their identity and the selection criteria 
are not accessible
Source: own edited based on the data published by the organizations conducting the surveys
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are based on unequal requirements, not on 
the same methodology, along the lines of 
questions that are not the same and based on 
samples that are not the same. In addition, 
the methodology description published by 
Transparency International does not reflect 
that statistical methods used for the calculation 
of the cPI are capable of distinguishing the 
accidental simultaneous movements from 
proven correlations, or are able to provide 
explanation for the discrepancies between the 
scores of each country and each period, thereby 
ensuring the requirements of comparability 
and thus the ranking of the countries. This 
is not remedied even by the fact that after 
the compilation of the rankings, in 2018 TI 
calculated the significance of the change in 
scores of each country, starting from 2012.
The evaluability of  the questions
Based on the questionnaires, in numerous cases 
the expert evaluate along the lines of questions 
the formation of which already does not allow 
for uniform and objective interpretation, for 
example: ‘State capture by narrow vested interests’ 
(AfDB), ‘To what extent does the government 
successfully contain corruption?’ (sGI), ‘Are 
there general abuses of public resources?’ ‘Is there 
a tradition of a payment of bribes?’ (EIu), 
‘Does the public display a high intolerance for 
official corruption?’ (fH). The indicator of 
the NiT evaluates a factor the connection of 
which to corruption is not proven: excessive 
state involvement in the economy. In addition 
to all of the above, the questionnaires contain 
numerous issues which can be evaluated based 
Figure 2 
the data sourCes By numBer used for the eValuation  
of the Countries eValuated By ti
Source: own edited based on the data published by Ti
Co
un
tr
ie
s 
(n
um
be
r)
The number of data sources used for the calculation of the CPI index
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on the objective examination and analysis of 
the legislative and institutional environment or 
criminal statistics, and not based on the survey 
of experts’ opinion: ‘To what extent are public 
officeholders who abuse their positions prosecuted 
or penalized?’ (Bf TI), ‘Is there an independent 
judiciary with the power to try ministers/public 
officials for abuses?’ ‘Is there an independent body 
auditing the management of public finances?’ 
(EIu), ‘Are there significant limitations on the 
participation of government officials in economic 
life?’ The legal protections of whistleblowers and 
journalists enjoy (fH).
Is the representativity of  the sample  
of  respondents ensured?
The data sources used reflect the evaluation of 
expert groups in seven cases, where the data 
providers cannot be representative in respect 
of the population of the countries evaluated. 
The requirements of representativity are not 
ensured regarding even those data sources 
where the research had been conducted with 
interviewing an especially great number 
of respondents. In the framework of the 
World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 
110 thousand households, 1000 persons per 
country were interviewed, at the same time, 
the data were collected in the 3 largest cities 
per country only, and as a result this index does 
not show the opinion of the population living 
in the countryside, in smaller settlements. The 
competitiveness ranking of the IMD, as well 
as the evaluation of Asian countries prepared 
by Political and Economic Risk consultancy 
are based on the opinions of 100 businessmen 
per country on average, which does not 
ensure representativity either in respect of the 
population of the countries evaluated, or even 
the businessmen active in the country. The risk 
lying in the construction of the respondent 
groups is that such groups may be able to 
ensure representativity in respect of the expert/
businessmen population which in itself is 
difficult to define, however, where evaluations 
are conducted with the involvement of 2 
to 3 experts per country, then not even this 
minimum requirement can be fulfilled.
Are expertise and impartiality ensured  
in the construction of  the expert panels?
The majority of the indicators used for the 
calculation of the cPI is expert’s evaluation. In 
course of the construction of such respondent 
groups it is a fundamental requirement that 
the special expertise and the impartiality 
of the respondents shall be ensured when 
selecting the experts. overall, in case of the 
data sources examined, the accessibility of the 
identity of the experts is limited, while the 
criteria of their selection are not accessible at 
all. for example, in case of the V-Dem- and 
the Nations in Transit indices the information 
related to the identity and the exact number 
of the experts and to the selection criteria is 
inaccessible (about the V-Dem- see McMann et 
al., 2016). In the framework of WJP’s survey, 
a panel consisting of 3000 persons – lawyers 
proficient in civil law, labour law, healthcare 
and in the field of justice – had also been 
interviewed, however, the selection method of 
the respondents is inaccessible. further risks 
lie in those data sources – for example the two 
indices of the Bertelsmann stiftung – where 
the scores represent the opinion of merely 2 to 
3 experts per country. All of this is worsened 
by that in case of Hungary it can be established 
that experts who are ideologically biased based 
on their participation in public life were asked 
to evaluate.8 Having studied the country 
reports of the indicators used by Bertelsmann 
stiftung, we established that in extreme cases 
the opinion of one single ‘country expert’ is 
behind the country reports. for the 2018 
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report about Hungary, the opinion of one 
single political science expert constituted the 
basis for the primary proposal for the scores of 
all sub-categories evaluated by the index.9
It poses a measuring risk that – based on 
the methodology descriptions available – it 
is not ensured that the expert evaluations are 
prepared by impartial persons who have special 
expertise. The expert evaluations may carry 
subjective elements, due to the small number 
of experts and the lack of transparency of the 
selection criteria.
general COnClusIOns
The measuring of corruption, and as result 
thereof the construction of international 
rankings may have severe consequences, may 
result in the public stigmatization of countries, 
as well as economic disadvantages. Therefore 
it is especially important to examine whether 
these international measurement systems 
provide an authentic picture, and whether 
they are scientifically reliable and valid.
Based on the specific literature, we can 
identify numerous risks affecting the scientific 
reliability and validity of the international 
indicators which measure corruption. The 
organizations which conduct the survey 
cannot be considered independent, they accept 
donations also from organizations which they 
rate. In a lot of cases the methodology used for 
constructing the index cannot be accessed to 
the extent that would allow the performance 
of independent researcher validation.
The cPI-based comparability of the 
countries is doubtful, since numbers and types 
of indicators and data sources different for each 
country are used in course of the development 
of the index. It is a risk affecting the validity 
of the ranking and the evaluation that the cPI 
does not use statistical methods which are able 
to distinguish the accidental simultaneous 
movements from the scientifically affirmable 
correlations.
The index reflects not only corruption 
but also the corruption perception poorly. 
The measures rely on non-representative 
samples. In case of the expert panels used as 
data providers, the principles of selection 
do not ensure lack of bias and the special 
expertise. The measuring risks are enhanced 
by the fact that the country ranking depicts 
the phenomenon of corruption as if only 
the passive corruption party, the state party 
was affected, and it disregards that the active 
corrupting party is a private operator, or – as 
the case may be – a foreigner compared to the 
country rated. This is one of the reasons why 
it is an important effort that the state shall 
establish relations with those operators of the 
private sector the lack of corruption of which 
the state had affirmed.
Despite the fact that cPI involves numerous 
indicators in the composite index, the cPI does 
not use tools which would allow the corruption 
risks and controls to be measured in an objective 
manner, and it does not examine the regulatory 
environment and institutional system 
responsible for reducing corruption either. In 
this matter there would be a chance to review 
and evaluate the laws, the system of sanctions, 
the special anti-corruption procedures and 
mechanisms, such as the guarantee of judicial 
independence, the regulation of conflict 
of interest cases, mechanisms managing 
whistleblowing. Another opportunity which 
goes beyond the horizon of the perception 
measures could be measuring the corruption 
risks, as well as the risk mitigating controls, 
based on the examination of the institutional 
factors and mechanisms.
The reliability of measuring corruption 
is essential for the prevention of corruption 
and for efficient action against corruption. 
However, the composite indices and the 
corruption rankings established based 
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thereon are unable to provide a detailed and 
accurate picture of the actual prevalence of 
corruption that would allow for a substantial 
professional debate about the opportunities 
of the actions against corruption. The fight 
against corruption is still a matter affecting 
the entirety of the society, which enjoys 
the support of the most important social, 
economic and state operators alike. Therefore 
development-facilitating measurement systems 
are necessary which can be used efficiently 
in the reduction of corruption. It can be 
established unambiguously that compared 
to the corruption perception measure and 
the cPI-type indices, the assessment of the 
sectoral, institutional corruption factors which 
are below the national level, the identification 
of the specific corruption hazards, and 
pointing out the necessity of the establishment 
of the control reducing corruption are more 
adequate tools for developing the measures 
against corruption.10
Notes
1 https://www.transparency.org/whoweare/account 
ability/who_supports_us/2
2 https://www.transparency.org/whoweare/
accountability/audited_financial_reports_with_
independent_auditors_report/2
3 According to the information published by 
Transparency International, the methodology 
of the cPI calculation consists of the following: 
(1) The data used for the calculation of the in-
dex are selected in accordance with the system 
of criteria specified by TI. (2) Afterwards, 
the source data are standardized. (3) The 
standardized data are aggregated through 
simple averaging. (4) finally, the uncertainties 
and the standard error are quantified. (source: 
corruption Perceptions Index 2018 full 
source Description, https://www.transparency.
org/cpi2018).
4 corruption Perceptions Index 2018 full source 
Description, https://www.transparency.org/cpi 
2018
5 see: http://www.sgi-network.org/docs/2018/
basics/sGI2018_codebook.pdf
6 see: https://www.transparency.org/files/content/
pages/2018_cPI_Methodology.zip
7 https://www.transparency.org/files/content/
pages/2018_cPI_2017_statisticalAssessment.
pdf, p. 16
8 The 46 central and Eastern Europe and south-
East Europe experts include nine Hungarians: 
eight of them who work for Political capital, as 
well as political scientist Attila Ágh.
9 Dániel Hegedűs, political scientist, Humboldt 
university, Berlin
10 This is the methodological approach which the 
state Audit office of Hungary has been using for 
mapping the integrity controls and risks of the 
Hungarian public institutions since 2011, and of 
the state and local government-owned business 
associations since 2016, see Németh et al. (2017).
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